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THE USE OF AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE
IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES
ROBERT A. RICHARDSON*
Lately, in the field of employment law, there has been a growing
trend by employers attempting to defend discrimination suits with
evidence or justifications acquired after the alleged discriminatory
conduct and after the employee has filed suit. Thus far, the courts
are unwilling to consider such evidence on the issue of liability,
but there is no clear consensus as to the relevance of such after-
acquired evidence on damages. This Article examines federal
cases which have discussed the impact of after-acquired evidence
on the issues of liability and damages; and then proposes stan-
dards for the use of such after-acquired evidence.
I. THE APPLICATION OF AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE TO THE
ISSUE OF LIABILITY
In employment discrimination cases, a plaintiff may establish
liability either by showing direct evidence of discrimination, or by
producing evidence which creates an inference of discrimination.
Under either approach, there is a strong argument against using
after-acquired evidence at the liability stage.
A. The Mixed-Motive Cases
In Mount Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle,1 an em-
ployee was terminated, in part, for legitimate reasons and, in part,
for engaging in constitutionally protected conduct. The plaintiff
was a teacher for the defendant. During his employment, Mr.
Doyle was involved in several negative incidents which were
known to his employer. First, he had argued with another
teacher, which resulted in the other teacher slapping him.2 After-
* The author is an associate at the law firm of Garrison & Arterton, P.C., in New Haven,
Connecticut, and appreciatively acknowledges the suggestions and comments of Joseph D.
Garrison, Esquire and Russell Dallai in the preparation of this article.
1 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
2 Id. at 281.
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wards he refused to accept an apology from the other teacher and
insisted that the other teacher be punished.3 On another occasion,
Mr. Doyle started an argument with members of the cafeteria
staff over the amount of food served to him.4 Later, he referred to
students as "sons of bitches" in connection with a disciplinary
complaint.5 On another occasion, while acting as cafeteria super-
visor, he made obscene gestures at two girls because they failed to
follow his orders. 6 Finally, after the school principal had circu-
lated a memorandum to staff members concerning the dress and
appearance of faculty members, Mr. Doyle disclosed the memoran-
dum to a radio disc jockey, who in turn, broadcasted the contents
of the memorandum over the radio.7 Mr. Doyle later apologized for
this incident.
Approximately one month after the radio station incident, the
superintendent made his routine annual recommendations to the
school board as to which faculty members should be rehired. The
superintendent recommended that Mr. Doyle, as well as nine
other faculty members, not be rehired." This recommendation was
adopted by the board. The reason given for not renewing Mr.
Doyle's contract was that he demonstrated "a notable lack of tact
in handling professional matters which leaves much doubt as to
[his] sincerity in establishing good school relationships."9 In sup-
port of this conclusion, the superintendent cited the incidents in-
volving the radio station and the obscene gestures. 10
The district court held that Mr. Doyle's conduct with respect to
the radio station was clearly protected by the First Amendment,
and because this protected conduct played a substantial part in
the decision not to renew his contract, he was entitled to reinstate-
ment and back pay." Additionally, the district court found a legit-
imate reason, independent of the First Amendment issue, for the
termination, specifically the obscene gestures made to the cafete-
ria workers. 12
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 282.
6 Mount Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 282 (1977).
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 283.
11 Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 283.
12 Id. at 285.
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The Supreme Court found that the employer not only could
have, but in fact, would have reached the same decision without
considering the constitutionally protected conduct. 13 The Court
held:
A rule of causation which focuses solely on whether protected
conduct played a part, "substantial" or otherwise, in a deci-
sion not to rehire, could place an employee in a better position
as a result of the exercise of constitutionally protected con-
duct than he would have occupied had he done nothing. The
difficulty with the rule enunciated by the District Court is
that it would require reinstatement in cases where a dramatic
and perhaps abrasive incident is inevitably on the minds of
those responsible for the decision to rehire, and does indeed
play a part in that decision, even if the same decision would
have been reached had the incident not occurred. The consti-
tutional principle at stake is sufficiently vindicated if such an
employee is placed in no worse a position than if he had not
engaged in the conduct. 4
Thus, a defendant employer should have the opportunity to show
by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the
same decision in the absence of the protected conduct. 15 However,
the language in Mount Healthy suggests that the employer, in at-
tempting to prove that the same decision would have been reached
absent the illegitimate reason, must base its proof on information
which was on the minds of the decision-makers and which did in-
deed play a part in the decision.
Thereafter, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,16 the United States
Supreme Court made it clear that, in mixed motive cases, 17 the
question of whether the employer would have made the same deci-
sion absent the discrimination is to be answered based on the in-
formation known by the employer at the time of its decision. The
Court stated that "proving that the same decision would have
been justified... is not the same thing as proving that the same
decision would have been made.""" "An employer may not, in other
13 Id.
14 Id. at 285-86 (emphasis added).
15 Id. at 287.
16 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion).
17 Id. at 248. A mixed-motive case is one in which the defendant's decision to terminate,
or otherwise discipline the plaintiff, involves a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate rea-
sons. Id.
18 Id. at 252 (quoting Ayers v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 555 F.2d 1309, 1315 (5th
1993]
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words, prevail in a mixed-motives case by offering a legitimate
and sufficient reason for its decision if that reason did not moti-
vate it at the time of the decision."19
Under the principles enunciated in Mount Healthy and Price
Waterhouse, an employer who discriminatorily terminates an indi-
vidual, but later discovers a legitimate reason for the termination,
could not have been motivated by the legitimate factor.20 The
Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse clearly requires the
motivating factor to exist at the time of the decision.
B. The Cases Involving Indirect Evidence of Discrimination
A plaintiff may indirectly establish a prima facie case of dis-
crimination by way of the McDonnell Douglas shifting burdens
analysis.2 ' Under this analysis, the plaintiff has the initial burden
of proving a prima facie case of discrimination. The burden then
shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate nondiscrimina-
tory reason for its action.2 2 In so doing, the defendant's reasons
must be clear and reasonably specific.23 If the defendant is able to
articulate a nondiscriminatory reason, the burden then shifts
back to the plaintiff to present evidence that tends to show that
the defendant's articulated reason is pretextual.24
Under the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the issue of after-ac-
quired evidence often will arise when the defendant attempts to
articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct. The reason,
however, "must be tested against facts known to the defendant at
the time of its action. Post hoc rationalizations, however persua-
sive, will not suffice." 25 Because reasons based on after-acquired
evidence could not have existed in the mind of the decision-maker
at the time of the decision, it cannot be inferred that such an ar-
Cir. 1977), vacated, 439 U.S. 410 (1979)).
19 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 252 (emphasis added), discussed and followed in Os-
trowski v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 968 F.2d 171, 182-83 (2d Cir. 1992).
20 EEOC v. Alton Packaging, 901 F.2d 920, 925 (11th Cir. 1990); Hill v. Seaboard Coast-
line R.R., 767 F.2d 771, 774 (11th Cir. 1985).
21 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
22 Id. at 802.
23 Id.; see also Diamantopulos v. Brookside Corp., 683 F. Supp. 322, 327 (D. Conn. 1988)
(stating that "vague or conclusory statements or reasons are insufficient ... the reasons
must be clear and specific.").
24 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
25 Alexander v. Local 496, Laborers Intern., 776 F. Supp. 1401, 1419 (D. Ohio 1991); see
also Williams v. TWA, 660 F.2d 1267, 1271 (8th Cir. 1981).
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ticulated reason actually motivated the defendant.2 6
C. The Cases Refusing to Consider After-Acquired Evidence on
the Issue of Liability
An examination of the case law demonstrates that the majority
of courts have upheld these principles and refused to consider af-
ter-acquired evidence when determining liability." For instance,
in Norris v. City of San Francisco,28 the plaintiff brought a race-
discrimination suit based on the defendants' failure to hire him.
In their attempts to justify plaintiffs rejection, the defendants' ex-
planations shifted during the course of litigation. The district
court observed at trial, "the reasons you gave [the EEOC investi-
gator] for ... not filling the position are totally different from the
reasons you're now stating."29 Despite this shift in explanations,
however, the district court accepted the defendants' explanation
and found no discrimination. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
reversed:
Clearly, information about [the plaintiff] which was unknown
to [defendant] at the time the decision was made could not
have entered into the calculus of the decision and would be
entirely irrelevant. Such after-acquired data cannot explain
the [defendant's] decision not to hire him. The issue to be re-
solved is whether [the plaintiffs] rejection, when it occurred,
was then actually motivated by illegal discrimination, not
whether the [defendant] could thereafter articulate some hy-
pothetical non-discriminatory reason for its decision. In de-
termining whether the [defendant's] articulated rationale is
pretextual, the district court must weigh and resolve not only
what information was known to the [defendant] at the time,
but also the plausibility of its explanations in light of all the
evidence and the inconsistency of these explanations over
time.3 0
Similar reasoning was applied by the United States District Court
26 See Harris v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 712 F.2d 1377, 1383 (11th Cir. 1983); Lanp-
hear v. Prokop, 703 F.2d 1311, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
27 These courts have done so under both the McDonnell Douglas and Price Waterhouse
schemes. See, e.g., Sabree v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners, 921 F.2d 396, 404 (1st
Cir. 1990) ("Price Waterhouse's directive to essentially take a snapshot at the moment of
the allegedly discriminatory act is applicable to all Title VII claims.").
28 900 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1990).
29 Id. at 1330.
30 Id. at 1331 (citations omitted).
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for the Western District of Pennsylvania in Garland v. U.S. Air,
Inc.
3 1
In EEOC v. Alton Packaging,32 the plaintiff brought suit against
his employer alleging a discriminatory failure to promote. The de-
fendant employer attempted to justify the refusal to promote by
producing evidence that after the plaintiff was denied a promo-
tion, a candidate with better qualifications applied for and re-
ceived the promotion. The court held that although the plaintiff
was less qualified than the person selected, this could not have
been a motivating factor for the employer's failure to promote be-
cause the selected applicant's qualifications were not known by
the employer at the time of the decision to deny plaintiffs
promotion.3 3
Similarly, in Thorne v. El Segundo, 4 plaintiff brought suit for
discriminatory failure to hire. As a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason for the refusal to hire, the employer claimed that it would
not have hired plaintiff based on his past-attendance record. The
court found that the plaintiffs attendance records were not avail-
able, let alone considered by the employer at the time of the deci-
sion.35 As a result, the employer's reason was held to be unworthy
of credence and pretextual3z
In Smith v. Equitable Life Assurance Society,37 the plaintiff
brought suit under Title VII alleging a discriminatory refusal to
31 767 F. Supp. 715, 725 (D. Pa. 1991). The defendant gave different justifications to the
EEOC, in response to plaintiffs request for admission, and in the pretrial statement to the
court. Id. The court stated that "[rleasons which are first articulated after the initiation of
the lawsuit are suspect and considered by the court to be self-serving." Id.
32 901 F.2d 920 (11th Cir. 1990).
33 Id. at 925; see also Hill v. Seaboard C.L.R. Co., 767 F.2d 771, 774 (11th Cir. 1985).
Although failure to promote an employee because the person actually promoted is more
qualified is a nondiscriminatory reason, the defendant's decision could not have been based
upon the candidates' qualifications because they were not known at that time. Id.; Joshi v.
Florida State Univ. Health Ctr., 763 F.2d 1227, 1235 (11th Cir.) (where female applicant's
qualifications were never compared with male applicant's qualifications, their relative
qualifications could not have been reason for not hiring female applicant), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 948 (1985); Eastland v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 704 F.2d 613, 626 (11th Cir. 1983)
(holding that in failure to hire case, defendant cannot assert, as nondiscriminatory reason,
that person actually hired was better qualified than plaintiff if qualifications of person
actually hired were not known at time decision not to hire plaintiff was made), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 1066 (1984).
34 726 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1983).
35 Id. at 467-68.
36 Id. at 468; see also DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 171 (2d Cir. 1993)
(stating that plaintiff, in discrimination suit, may prove pretext by showing that employer's
nondiscriminatory reason was first articulated only after allegation of discrimination).
37 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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promote, retaliation, and harassment. During discovery, the em-
ployer learned that, during the course of her employment, the
plaintiff had falsified her group-insurance application and an in-
surance claim. Based on this after-acquired evidence, the em-
ployer moved for summary judgment on all counts, arguing that
had it learned of the misconduct during plaintiffs employment,
plaintiff would have been fired immediately. Denying summary
judgment on this basis, the court stated:
Because defendants first discovered plaintiffs misconduct
during her pretrial deposition, but were not aware of it when
she was employed by them, the Court finds that Plaintiffs fal-
sification of her insurance application has little relevance on
this motion. McDonnell Douglas, which sets forth the shifting
burdens in a Title VII case, clearly presupposes a "legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason" known to the employer at the
time of the employee's discharge. While the jury may con-
sider such information in assessing plaintiffs damages, if
any, the Court finds this information irrelevant in assessing
the reasons defendants had in 1990 for discharging
Plaintiff.38
The court, however, granted summary judgment on other
grounds.
II. THE EFFECT OF AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE ON DAMAGES
A. The Cases Considering After-Acquired Evidence on the Issue
of Damages
1. The Cases Holding that After-Acquired Evidence
Precludes the Employee from Recovering Any Damages
Although courts have been reluctant to consider after-acquired
evidence on the issue of liability,3 9 courts have been more willing
38 Id. at 1227 (emphasis added).
39 See Kristufek v. Hussman Foodservice Co., 985 F.2d 364, 369 (7th Cir. 1993) ("A dis-
criminatory firing must be decided solely with respect to the known circumstances leading
to the discharge."); see also Jolly v. Northern Telecom, Inc., 766 F. Supp. 480, 494 (D. Va.
1991). The defendant's shifting explanations and inconsistent stories caused the court to
state: "defendant's various personnel told so many stories, so totally inconsistent with each
other, that they had lost all credibility by the conclusion of the proceedings. Put simply,
[defendant] took more positions than a gymnast on a trampoline." Id.; Townsend v. Wash-
ington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 746 F. Supp. 178, 186 (D.D.C. 1990). The defendant, at
trial, gave a point-by-point comparison of plaintiffs qualifications versus those of the per-
son who received the promotion. Id. Recognizing that the employer did no such comparison
when it made the decision to deny plaintiff his promotion, the court stated that an em-
1993]
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to consider after-acquired evidence on the issue of damages. In so
doing, these courts have relied on the theory that if the employer
can show that it would never have hired the employee or would
have terminated the employee had it known of the after-acquired
evidence, then the employee has sustained no damage as a result
of the discriminatory termination.
For example, in Summers v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance
Co. , the plaintiff brought suit for wrongful termination based on
age and religion. Prior to his termination, the plaintiff had been
placed on probation for falsifying company records and was
warned that future falsifications would lead to his discharge. 4 1
However, at the time of plaintiffs termination, he was told by
company officials that he was not being fired for falsification of
records but rather he was being fired because of his poor attitude,
his inability to get along with coworkers, and for his similar
problems in dealing with the public. Four years after the termina-
tion, the defendant learned that the plaintiff had falsified more
than 150 company documents. 42 Based on this after-acquired evi-
dence, the defendant moved for summary judgment. Granting
summary judgment, the Tenth Circuit made clear that the after-
acquired evidence did not relate to the McDonnell Douglas analy-
sis, nor did the evidence relate to the reasons for the plaintiffs
discharge.43 Instead, the court relied, in part, on the Mount
Healthy decision, and held that the evidence showed that the
plaintiff sustained no injury from the allegedly discriminatory ter-
mination.44 The court stated:
To argue, as Summers does, that this after-acquired evidence
should be ignored, is utterly unrealistic. The present case is
ployer's post hac rationale for discrimination "carries the seeds of its own destruction." Id.
But see Johnson v. Honeywell Infor. Sys., 955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1992). After the plaintiffs
termination, the defendant learned that plaintiff misrepresented her lack of a college de-
gree by responding to a job advertisement that specifically required a college degree. Id. at
414. The federal court, applying Michigan state law in diversity, concluded that Michigan's
highest court would allow after-acquired evidence to be considered on the issue of liability.
Id.; Sweeney v. U-Haul Co., 55 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) T 40,598 (N.D. Ill. 1991). Plaintiff
was unable to show that the defendant's reason for terminating him was pretextual where
the defendant learned that plaintiffs job application contained eleven misrepresentations
regarding the reason for previous dismissals from employment. Id.
40 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988).
41 Id. at 702.
42 Id. at 703.
43 Id. at 704-05.
44 Id. at 708.
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akin to the hypothetical wherein a company doctor is fired be-
cause of his age, race, religion and sex and the company, in
defending a civil rights action, thereafter discovers that the
discharged employee was not a "doctor." In our view, the
masquerading doctor would be entitled to no relief, and Sum-
mers is in no better position.45
In granting summary judgment, the Summers court assumed
that the defendant was motivated, at least in part, if not substan-
tially, by plaintiffs age and religion.4 6
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Summers, allowing an employer
to use after-acquired evidence to prove that the same decision
would have been reached, appears to be at odds with Mount
Healthy as refined by Price Waterhouse.47 Summers relied on the
language in Mount Healthy stating that a plaintiff "ought not to be
able, by engaging in [protected] conduct, to prevent his employer
from assessing his performance record and reaching a decision not
to rehire on the basis of that record, simply because the protected
conduct makes the employer more certain of the correctness of the
decision."48 However, the Mount Healthy court clearly made this
statement in light of evidence that was known to the employer at
the time of the termination decision and actually considered. In
Mount Healthy, the protected conduct was the last incident in a
string of incidents known and considered by the employer in mak-
ing the decision.49
Despite its questionable legal foundation, Summers has been
followed by a number of courts, including the Sixth Circuit. In
Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological University,50 a plain-
tiff brought suit for sex discrimination and retaliation. During the
course of litigation, the employer learned that the plaintiff had
lied on her job application by not disclosing a criminal conviction
for driving under the influence of alcohol. The trial court found
direct evidence of discrimination and rendered a plaintiffs ver-
dict. The court, however, held that the employer would have fired
45 Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700, 708 (10th Cir. 1988).
46 Id.
47 The Tenth Circuit decided Summers before the United States Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion).
48 Summers, 864 F.2d at 706 (quoting Mount Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429
U.S. 274, 286 (1977)).
49 Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 282-83.
50 975 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 2991, cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct.
22 (1993).
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the plaintiff had it known about the falsified job application. As a
result, the trial court randomly reduced plaintiffs damages by
fifty percent.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the trial court's decision
and followed the Tenth Circuit's Summers analysis. The court
held that the plaintiff suffered no injury from her discriminatory
discharge because the trial court found that the employer would
have terminated her had it known about the falsified application.
Applying the Summers analysis, the Sixth Circuit stated that if
the plaintiff would have been fired had the employer known of the
falsification, the plaintiff suffers no legal damage by being fired.51
In Bonger v. American Water Works,52 the plaintiff brought suit
against her employer for sex discrimination and retaliation. After
plaintiffs termination, the defendant learned that the plaintiff
misrepresented on her resume that she had a college degree. Re-
lying on Summers, the court dismissed the case and held that the
plaintiff suffered no damages because had her employer known of
the falsifications on her job application, it would have discharged
her regardless of the discrimination.53 The court stated that there
are many situations in which an employer probably would not dis-
charge an employee when it subsequently discovers that the em-
ployee committed resume fraud, despite the fact that the em-
ployee probably would not have been hired absent the resume
fraud. In such situations, the court acknowledged that the em-
ployee would indeed suffer injury if discharged on the basis of dis-
crimination. 54 However, in Bonger, the court held that this was
not the case, both because the defendant maintained a written
policy that dishonesty in the application process constituted
grounds for termination, and because the defendant submitted af-
fidavits stating that it would have discharged the plaintiff for her
misrepresentations.
Similarly, in Churchman v. Pinkerton's Inc., a plaintiffs suit
for sexual harassment was dismissed on summary judgment be-
cause the court found that the plaintiff sustained no injury as a
result of her termination. In Churchman, the defendant learned,
51 Id. at 304-05.
52 789 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1992).
53 Id. at 1106.
54 Id.
55 756 F. Supp. 515 (D. Kan. 1991).
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during discovery, that the plaintiffs job application contained an
exorbitant number of lies and omissions. Specifically, the plaintiff
had (1) omitted some of her past addresses; (2) stated that she had
not been hospitalized during the previous five years for a mental
condition, when, in fact, she had been hospitalized approximately
six months earlier for attempting suicide; (3) stated that she had
not used any narcotic drugs or illegal drugs, when, in fact, she had
used speed, valium, and marijuana; (4) stated that she had never
been terminated for cause, when, in fact, she had been terminated
for cause twice before; and (5) in response to a question asking her
to list all jobs held during the previous ten years, she listed five
out of ten jobs, excluding, among others, the jobs from which she
was fired for cause.56 At the bottom of her application, the plaintiff
also signed a statement that failure to answer all questions or
making any misrepresentations on the application would serve as
a basis for termination.57 In her deposition, plaintiff stated that
she made some of her omissions because disclosure would have
been "kind of stupid on my part."58 She explained that she lied
about being terminated for cause because she thought to herself
"how many people [are] going to hire somebody, especially a secur-
ity firm, if they had been fired from another job."59
Relying on Summers, the court granted summary judgment and
found that the omissions and misrepresentations were directly
relevant to the hiring decision because they tended to show insta-
bility in the plaintiffs work life and her personal life.6 0 In addi-
tion, plaintiffs deposition testimony indicated that she fully ap-
preciated the significance of disclosing the facts and the adverse
consequences that would have resulted had she done so. 6 1 Sum-
mary judgment was appropriate because "[p]laintiff [had] wholly
failed to present any evidence to rebut the statements of [defend-
ant's] representatives that plaintiff would have been terminated
based upon the discovery of the material omissions and
falsities."62
56 Id. at 518.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 517-18.
59 Id. at 518.
60 Churchman v. Pinkerton's Inc., 756 F. Supp. 515, 521 (D. Kan. 1991).
61 Id.
62 Id.; see also Guzman v. United Airlines, No. 88-24-1-Z, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9390, at
*12 (D. Mass July 20, 1991). The court granted summary judgment based on the em-
1993]
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In most courts that recognize it, the Summers defense should
and does have limitations. In Reed v. AMAX Co., 63 an employee
brought a race-discrimination suit against his employer. After the
plaintiffs termination and during discovery, the employer learned
that the plaintiff had falsified his job application by stating that
he had never been convicted of a felony. 64 Relying on Summers,
the defendant moved for summary judgment, claiming that the
plaintiff could have been fired based on the misrepresentations
contained in his job application. Denying summary judgment, the
Seventh Circuit held that the defendant's interpretation of Sum-
mers was too broad. According to the Seventh Circuit, Summers
and analogous cases require proof that the employer would have
fired the employee, not simply that the employer could have fired
the employee. 65 The court added that the purpose of requiring
such proof is "to prevent employers from avoiding Title VII liabil-
ity by pointing to minor rule violations which may technically sub-
ject the employee to dismissal but would not, in fact, result in dis-
charge."66 As the Reed decision illustrates, the Summers defense
ployer's after-acquired evidence that the employee falsified the medical portion of the em-
ployment application. Id. The employer testified, without contradiction, that the falsifica-
tion would have been grounds for terminating the employee and that the employee would
never have been hired had the true medical condition been known. Id. Guzman, however,
predates the effective date of the Americans with Disabilities Act and it is questionable as
to whether the employer could have used the same medical evidence after the effective date
of the Act. Id. For instance, in Husienga v. Opus Corp., 494 N.W.2d 469 (Minn. 1992), an
employer sought to avoid workers' compensation payments to an employee based on after-
acquired evidence that the employee responded falsely to certain pre-employment ques-
tions about his medical history. Id. at 471. Applying Minnesota's Human Rights Act, the
court rejected the employer's defense and held that the employer could only raise such a
defense if the health related questions were job related. Id. at 473. Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act, the employer is prohibited from asking such pre-employment medical
history questions. Id.; see also Mathis v. Boeing Military Airplane Co., 719 F. Supp. 991,
993 (D. Kan. 1989) (granting summary judgment where plaintiff failed to reveal that (1)
she had pleaded guilty to a felony, (2) had resigned from her former federal government job
to avoid suspension, and (3) she had been terminated from three prior federal agencies for
poor performance.).
63 971 F.2d 1295 (7th Cir. 1992).
64 Id. at 1298.
65 Id.
66 Id.; see also O'Driscoll v. Hercules Inc., 745 F. Supp. 656, 659 (D. Utah 1990), affd, 12
F.3d 176 (1994). The court held that the Summers holding does not allow an employer to
comb through an employee's file after a discriminatory discharge "t]o discover minor, triv-
ial or technical infractions" and that the employee's misrepresentations of her age, her chil-
dren's age, the year of her high school graduation and the fact that she had applied for a job
with the defendant once before all fell within this category of infractions. Id. at 659; O'Day
v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 784 F. Supp. 1466, 1470 (D. Ariz. 1992) (in order to
use after-acquired evidence to preclude employee's relief, employer must prove that had it
known of employee's misconduct, employee would have been discharged immediately);
Devoe v. Medi-Dyn, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 546,552 (D. Kan. 1992) (denying summary judgment
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will sometimes raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
the employer would have taken the same action had it known of
the after-acquired evidence at the time of its decision, thereby
making summary judgment inappropriate. The case of Punahele
v. United Air Lines, Inc.,67 is illustrative of this point.
In Punahele, the employee brought suit for a discriminatory re-
fusal to hire.6' During litigation, United Air Lines ("United")
learned that Punahele failed to disclose his tardiness record with
his former employer and did not disclose that he had earlier been
convicted of a felony.6 9 United moved for summary judgment con-
tending that, regardless of discrimination, it would not have hired
Punahele had it known of the after-acquired information. 70 In
support of this argument, United submitted the affidavit of its se-
nior employment representative. According to the affidavit,
United's standard operating procedure was to ask each applicant
for his previous tardiness record before hiring.7 1 If the applicant
did not recall the information, then United would obtain it from
an employment records service.72 United's representative con-
tended that since Punahele's attendance record was not requested
from the records service, United must have asked Punahele for
the information and he must have concealed the truth with his
answer. 
73
According to Punahele, however, United never asked him for his
tardiness record and, even if he had been asked, he would have
told them that he could not recall it.74 Punahele also claimed that
had United known of his tardiness record, he still would have
been hired. In large part, Punahele's tardiness record was formed
during a strike against his former employer and, therefore, might
not have been accurately recorded.7 5 Also, Punahele had worked
for three months as a temporary employee for United, during
which time he compiled a perfect dependability rating and his at-
for employer who actually knew of alleged concealment by employee at time of firing but
did not rely upon it as reason for terminating employment).
67 756 F. Supp. 487 (D. Colo. 1991).
68 Id. at 488.
69 Id. at 489.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 490-91.
72 See Punahele v. United Air Lines, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 487, 491 (D. Colo. 1991).
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
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tendance was outstanding.76 Finding genuine issues of material
fact as to whether (1) United followed its standard operating pro-
cedure, and (2) whether United would have refused to hire
Punahele even if it had followed its procedure, the court denied
United's motion for summary judgment.7 7
2. The Cases Reducing or Limiting the Employee's Damage
Recovery Based on After-Acquired Evidence
While the Tenth and Sixth Circuit decisions, such as Summers,
Bonger, and Milligan-Jensen allow an employer to use after-ac-
quired evidence to cut off damages entirely, other courts have re-
fused to impose such a harsh sanction and, instead have chosen to
reduce or limit the plaintiffs damages. In Smith v. General Scan-
ning, Inc.,78 the plaintiff sued his employer for discriminatory ter-
mination. After the plaintiffs termination, the defendant learned
that plaintiffs resume contained certain falsifications and at-
tempted to use it to justify the employee's termination.79 The Sev-
enth Circuit refused to admit the evidence on the issue of liability
or on the issue of damages.8 0 However, in a footnote, the court
stated that, in some cases, the after-acquired evidence would be
relevant for the purpose of determining damages."' For instance,
"i]t would hardly make sense to order [the plaintiff] reinstated to
a job which he lied to get and from which he properly could have
been discharged .... [T]he same would be true regarding any
back pay accumulation after the fraud was discovered." 2
Recently, the Seventh Circuit provided additional guidance on
the relationship between after-acquired evidence and damages.
In Kristufek v. Hussmann Foodservice Co.,83 the plaintiff brought
suit for a discriminatory termination based on age. After the initi-
ation of the lawsuit, the defendant learned that the plaintiff had
76 Id.
77 Punahele v. United Air Lines, Inc. 756 F. Supp. 487, 491 (D. Colo. 1991); see also
Rupley v. Rorer Pharmaceutical Corp., No. 90-C-5597, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1779, at *18-
19 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 19, 1992). The employer argued that it would have terminated the em-
ployee had it known that he had other outside employment. Id. However, the court rejected
the employer's argument because there was evidence that his immediate supervisor was
aware of the outside employment but did not fire him. Id.
78 876 F.2d 1315 (7th Cir. 1989).
79 Id. at 1317.
80 Id. at 1319-20.
81 Id. at 1319 n.2.
82 Id. (citation omitted).
83 985 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993).
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falsified his educational qualifications at the time of hiring. The
district court held that Kristufek's fraudulent conduct barred him
from any recovery.8 4 The Seventh Circuit reversed.
Relying on Smith v. General Scanning, Inc.,5 the Seventh Cir-
cuit stated, at the outset, that Kristufek's resume fraud had noth-
ing to do with the issue of liability because it was not discovered
until after the termination. 6 The court held:
A discriminatory firing must be decided solely with respect to
the known circumstances leading to the discharge. The deter-
ring statutory penalty is for retaliatory firing, the character of
which is not changed by some after discovered alternate rea-
son for discharge which might have been used but was not.
Next, the Seventh Circuit explored the impact of the after-ac-
quired evidence on damages. Relying on Summers,87 the em-
ployer argued that Kristufek should not recover any damages
based on the after-acquired evidence. The court, however, distin-
guished Summers. Many of the employee's falsifications, in Sum-
mers, were known to his employer at the time of the discharge.
Summers was repeatedly warned that continued falsifications
could result in dismissal. In Kristufek, however, the employee's
one-time falsification was not known by his employer until after
his discharge.88 Additionally, the court found that Kristufek's fal-
sification was not of a critical nature because the record demon-
strated that although his falsely represented educational back-
ground would have been desirable, it was not a prerequisite for
the job.8 9 The court stated that "those qualifications were not so
critical as to cancel out the statutory penalty for a discriminatory
firing. Kristufek functioned well without those degrees."90
Although the court held that the after-acquired evidence did not
preclude Kristufek from recovering damages, it would be appro-
priate to limit his back pay award by cutting off his damages as of
the date that the evidence was actually discovered.9
The Eleventh Circuit has also refused to allow the Summers de-
84 Id. at 369.
85 876 F.2d 1315 (7th Cir. 1989).
86 Kristufek v. Hussmann Foodservice Co., 985 F.2d 364, 370 (7th Cir. 1993).
87 Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988).
88 See Kristufek, 985 F.2d at 379.
89 Id. at 370.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 371.
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fense to serve as a complete bar to damages.92 In Wallace v. Dunn
Construction Co. ," the plaintiff brought suit alleging sexual har-
assment and violations of the Equal Pay Act. The defendant
learned, during discovery, that the plaintiff had lied on her job
application by stating that she had not been convicted of a
crime.94 Using this after-acquired evidence, the defendant moved
for a partial summary judgment, based on Summers, claiming
that the fraud would have served as a legitimate reason for dis-
charge, even without unlawful motives. Acknowledging that the
Summers defense was an issue of first impression in the Eleventh
Circuit, the court, per Senior Circuit Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr.,
rejected the defense and provided an in-depth and well-reasoned
discussion.9 5
First, the court looked at the cases relied upon by Summers for
the proposition that after-acquired evidence can be used to show
that the plaintiff has suffered no injury and therefore is not enti-
tled to damages. The court stated that Summers relied signifi-
cantly on three cases, Blalock v. Metals Trades, Inc.,96 Smallwood
v. United Air Lines, Inc.," and Murnane v. American Air Lines.98
The court found these cases to be clearly distinguishable from the
facts of Summers.99 Blalock did not involve after-acquired evi-
dence at all.' 00 Smallwood and Murnane involved refusals to re-
hire that would have happened even without an illegal motivation
because the employers proved that, in the next step in their hiring
process, they would have uncovered the legitimate reason for not
hiring the employee. 1 1 Thus, in Smallwood and Murnane, the
employees suffered no injury "because, in fact, they never would
have been hired even absent the discriminatory motive."' °2
The Eleventh Circuit next analyzed Summers' interpretation of
the Supreme Court's decision in Mount Healthy. The Eleventh
Circuit stated: "we agree with the Summers court that Mount
92 See Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992).
93 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992).
94 Id. at 1177.
95 Id. at 1178-84.
96 775 F.2d 703 (6th Cir. 1985).
97 728 F.2d 614 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 832 (1984).
98 667 F.2d 98 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982).
99 See Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1178 (11th Cir. 1992).
100 Id. at 1179.
101 Id.
102 Id.
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Healthy provides important and persuasive guidance concerning
after-acquired evidence; however, we take issue with the Tenth
Circuit's interpretation of Mount Healthy and find that Mount
Healthy and related principles actually subvert, rather than sup-
port the Tenth Circuit's rule."1 °3 Finding that the Summers deci-
sion unreasonably extended the Mount Healthy principles, the
Eleventh Circuit stated that Summers ignored the lapse of time
between the employment decision and the discovery of the legiti-
mate reason for discharge. 104 In Mount Healthy, the legitimate
reason for discharge was known and considered at the time of the
decision to discharge. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that while
Mount Healthy excuses all liability based on what actually would
have happened, Summers goes one step further:
[Summers] excuses all liability based on what hypothetically
would have occurred absent the alleged discriminatory motive
assuming the employer had knowledge that it would not ac-
quire until sometime during the litigation arising from the
discharge. In doing so, the Summers rule clashes with the
Mount Healthy principle (adapted for use in statutory dis-
crimination cases) that the plaintiff should be left in no worse
a position than if she had not been a member of a protected
class or engaged in protected opposition to an unlawful em-
ployment practice. The Tenth Circuit clearly placed Sum-
mers in a worse position than if he had not been a member of
a protected class. According to the facts assumed by the
Court, absent his age and his religion, Summers would have
remained employed for at least some period of time after he
was actually discharged. Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit de-
nied him any relief for that lost period of employment.
10 5
Next, the Eleventh Circuit examined the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Price Waterhouse, which was decided after Summers. The
Eleventh Circuit held that Price Waterhouse clarified Mount
Healthy's role with respect to Title VII cases. The Eleventh Cir-
cuit noted that both the plurality and concurrences in Price
Waterhouse confirmed that the Mount Healthy decision held that
if the plaintiff in a mixed-motives case proves a prima facie case of
discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that
103 Id. at 1178-79.
104 See Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1179 (11th Cir. 1992).
105 Id. at 1179-80 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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the same decision would actually have been made absent the dis-
crimination.1 0 6 Thus, according to the Eleventh Circuit, Summers
improperly ignored the time lapse between the unlawful act and
the discovery of a legitimate reason for discharge, thereby putting
the plaintiff in a worse position than if he had not been a member
of a protected class. 10 7
The Eleventh Circuit also found the Summers decision to be
"antithetical" to the principal purpose of Title VII.08 The princi-
pal purpose of Title VII is "'to achieve equality of employment op-
portunity' by giving employers incentives 'to self examine and self
evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate,
so far as possible,' employment discrimination.""0 9 With this goal
in mind, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the Summers de-
fense does not encourage employers to eliminate discrimination,
but rather, the defense encourages employers "to establish ludi-
crously low thresholds for 'legitimate' termination and to devote
fewer resources to preventing discrimination because Summers
gives them the option to escape all liability by rummaging through
an unlawfully discharged employee's background for flaws and
then manufactur[e] a legitimate reason for the discharge that fits
the flaws in the employee's background."" 0
After rejecting the Summers approach, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that the proper role of after-acquired evidence is that it
may be used to reduce or limit damages."' However, the court
held that the employer should bear the burden of showing by a
preponderance of the evidence whether and in what manner the
after-acquired evidence would have altered the employment rela-
tionship. 1 2 The court stated that the application of this rule will
vary on the facts of each case. 1 3 If the after-acquired evidence, in
and of itself, would have caused the defendant to fire the plaintiff,
then the court stated that it would be inappropriate to order rein-
106 Id. at 1180.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1179 (11th Cir. 1992) (quoting Al-
bermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975) and Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971)).
110 See Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1180.
111 Id. at 1181-82.
112 Id. at 1181 n.11.
113 Id.
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statement or front pay.114 With respect to an award of back pay,
the court held that plaintiffs back pay period should not be pre-
maturely cut off unless and until the defendant can prove that it
would have discovered the after-acquired evidence before the end
of the back pay period. 1 5 The court noted that an alternative ap-
proach could be to cut off the back pay award on the day that the
defendant actually discovered the after-acquired evidence. How-
ever, the court rejected this approach because it overlooks the rule
in Mount Healthy and Price Waterhouse that a plaintiff should be
placed in no worse of a position than if she were not a member of a
protected class or if she did not engage in protected conduct.1 16
The Eleventh Circuit's approach to after-acquired evidence has
also been followed by a district court in the Third Circuit. In Mas-
sey v. Trump's Castle Hotel & Casino,"7 an employee sued his em-
ployer for discriminatory termination. The employee was alleg-
edly terminated for economic and financial considerations.
During litigation, the employer discovered that the employee had
lied on his job application. Specifically, the employee had stated
that he left a former job for personal reasons when, in fact, he was
forced to leave due to claims of sexual harassment. The employee
also failed to disclose that he had been forced to resign from a for-
mer job as a policeman because he lost his gun."l8 The employer
argued that, even though the after-acquired evidence played no
role in the employee's termination, the evidence precluded him
from recovering any relief under his discriminatory discharge
claim.
In ruling on the after-acquired evidence defense, the court noted
114 Id. at 1181 (citing Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Tech. Univ., 767 F. Supp. 1403 (D.
Mich. 1991), rev'd, 975 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 2991, cert. dis-
missed, 114 S. Ct. 22 (1993) (involving falsification of employment application)).
115 Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1182 (11th Cir. 1992).
116 Id. In a more recent decision, the Eleventh Circuit, again, rejected an employer's
after-acquired evidence defense. In Calloway v. Partners Nat'l Health Plans, 986 F.2d 446
(11th Cir. 1993), an employer tried to avoid a wage discrimination suit based on after-
acquired evidence that the employee misrepresented on her resume that she had a college
degree. The Eleventh Circuit rejected the employer's "unclean hands" argument. Under the
doctrine of unclean hands, the employer must show (1) that the employee's wrongdoing is
directly related to the employee's claim asserted and (2) that the employer was injured by
the wrongdoing. Id. at 447. The court held that the misrepresentation that she had a col-
lege degree was unrelated to her wage claim because her predecessor and successor did not
have college degrees. Id. The court also found that the employer was not harmed by the
employee's misrepresentation, especially where the employee was performing her job in a
satisfactory manner at the time of discharge. Id. at 451.
117 828 F. Supp. 314 (D. N.J. 1993).
118 Id. at 317.
1993]
116 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
that the issue was one of first impression in the Third Circuit.
The court then discussed the various approaches used by other
federal courts and concluded that the Eleventh Circuit's approach
to after-acquired evidence was the most logical and equitable. The
court held that the discriminatory discharge claim would not be
barred by the after-acquired evidence, however, the evidence
could preclude an award of front pay or reinstatement. 1 9 In
reaching this conclusion, the court specifically rejected that Tenth
Circuit's holding, in Summers, that, in an after-acquired evidence
case, the employee suffers no injury as a result of the discrimina-
tory discharge. The court stated:
It is problematic at best to say that there has been no injury
in the face of proven illegal conduct. The after-acquired evi-
dence cases are not equivalent to the mixed motive cases upon
which they rely. In a mixed motive case, the employer had
more than one reason for its employment decision, and that
decision would not have been changed if the illegal motives
were removed. In the after-acquired evidence cases, however,
the employment decision was based solely on illegal grounds.
Absent those illegal motives, the employee would still be
employed. L20
The Massey court also agreed with the Eleventh Circuit's con-
clusion in Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co., that allowing after-
acquired evidence to serve as a complete bar to recovery is incon-
sistent with the "make whole" purposes of Title VII. The court
stated that the after-acquired evidence defense "could cause em-
ployees who did something wrong in the past to quietly endure
discriminatory treatment rather than complain, regardless of how
long ago the misconduct occurred or its triviality."' 2 '
As to the impact that the after-acquired evidence should have
on back pay, the Massey court followed the Eleventh Circuit's ap-
proach in Wallace and held that back pay should be available to
the employee until the time of judgment. The court indicated that
it would be unfair to cut off back pay as of the date that the em-
119 Id. at 322.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 323. The defendant argued that allowing employees to recover damages in af-
ter-acquired evidence cases would encourage employees to lie on their resumes and job
applications. Id. The court found it "preposterous that an employee would refrain from
lying because she anticipates that she may be illegally discriminated against later and
wants to preserve her rights." Id. at 322 n.10.
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ployer actually learned of the misconduct because that date is
tainted by the employee's attempt to vindicate its rights.1 22
Most recently, the National Labor Relations Board (the
"NLRB") indicated that it is unwilling to allow after-acquired evi-
dence to preclude an award of damages in cases arising under the
National Labor Relations Act (the "NLRA"). In ABF Freight Sys-
tems, Inc. v. NLRB, 23 a company terminated an employee be-
cause he had engaged in conduct protected by the NLRA. The
company told the employee that he was being terminated for being
late without good cause, in violation of a new company policy. At-
tempting to avoid the termination, the employee lied about why he
was late. The company found out that he was lying and termi-
nated him for violating the tardiness policy. In response, the em-
ployee filed an unfair labor practice claim with the NLRB.
At a hearing before an administrative law judge, the employee,
under oath, repeated his false excuse for being late to work. The
judge found that he was lying and that, therefore, the employer
fired him for good cause.' 24 Reversing this ruling, the NLRB ac-
knowledged that the employee lied to his employer and could have
been fired for lying, however, the NLRB pointed out that the em-
ployee was not fired for lying; he was fired for tardiness.'2 5 There
was "abundant evidence" in the record of antiunion animus by the
employer towards the employee.' 26 As a result, the NLRB found
that the reason given for the employee's termination was pretex-
tual and that the real reason was in retaliation for his having en-
gaged in protected labor activities. Thus, despite the fact that the
employee lied to his employer and committed perjury before the
administrative law judge, the NLRB reinstated him to his position
with back pay. The NLRB's decision was upheld on appeal and
the employer appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of whether
"an employee forfeit[s] the remedy of reinstatement with back pay
after the administrative law judge finds that he purposefully testi-
fied falsely during the administrative hearing." 27 The Court
122 Massey v. Trump's Castle Hotel & Casino, 828 F. Supp. 314, 323-24 (D. N.J. 1993).
123 114 S. Ct. 835 (1993).
124 Id. at 838.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 839 n.8.
1993]
118 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 9:97
stated that since Congress delegated primary responsibility to the
NLRB for making remedial decisions that will best effectuate the
policies of the NLRA, great deference should be given to the
NLRB's decision. The Court held that the NLRB did not abuse its
discretion in awarding damages, even though the employee gave
perjured testimony. The Court said that it could not "fault the
Board's conclusion that [the employee's] reason for being late to
work was ultimately irrelevant to whether antiunion animus ac-
tually motivated his discharge and that ordering effective relief in
a case of this character promotes a vital public interest."12
The ABF decision discussed damage awards under the NLRA,
not Title VII. However, the Supreme Court has held that the back
pay provisions of Title VII were expressly modeled after the back
pay provisions of the NLRA.
129
B. Standards for the Use of After-Acquired Evidence When
Assessing Damages
As the cases demonstrate, the courts do not have a uniform view
on the effect of after-acquired evidence on damages. At one end of
the spectrum, the result can be extremely harsh when a plaintiff,
who has made out a prima facie case of discrimination, is dis-
missed on summary judgment based on evidence acquired after
the employer's discriminatory act.130  Such evidence obviously
128 ABF Freight Systems, 114 S. Ct. at 840. In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia,
joined by Justice O'Connor, indicated his belief that the NLRB should have denied rein-
statement based on the perjury. Id. Justice Scalia stated that the employee had been given
adequate relief without the reinstatement. Id. at 842-43.
129 See Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419-20 (1975).
130 At least one district court has rejected the Summers principle because the remedy is
too harsh. In Benitez v. Portland General Electric, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1130 (D.
Or. 1992), the employee brought suit for national origin discrimination. Id. at 1132. The
employer, during discovery, learned that the employee failed to disclose on his employment
application several shoplifting convictions. Id. at 1136. Relying on Summers, the employer
moved for summary judgment arguing that the employee would never had been hired had
the employer known of the convictions. Id. In support of the motion for summary judgment,
the company's Human Resource Manager submitted an affidavit. Id. Additionally, the job
application itself stated that misrepresentations would be grounds for termination. Id.
The court stated that the Summers principle had not been adopted by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals and that the majority of circuit courts had not addressed the Summers
issue. Id. Furthermore, if the employment application stated that misrepresentations may
be cause for the applicant's discharge, then the employer may have the right to terminate
the employee; however, it does not automatically follow that just because the employee may
now be subject to discharge his discrimination claim must be dismissed. Id. The district
court held that "[i]n view of the absence of Ninth Circuit precedent, and the harshness of
the result urged by the defendant, I decline to dismiss the discrimination claims on the
basis of defendant's after acquired evidence." Id.
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played no role in the employer's decision to take the adverse ac-
tion. Thus, allowing such evidence to negate any damage recovery
is rather harsh and serves to undermine the civil rights laws. One
of the more effective ways of deterring discrimination is to assess
damages against employers who have engaged in discrimina-
tion.131 Additionally, under the remedial scheme of the federal dis-
crimination laws, victims of discrimination should be compen-
sated for their injuries. 132  Cases holding that after-acquired
evidence may be used to cut off damages entirely, in essence, hold
that an employee who, at some time in the past, made misrepre-
sentations on his or her resume or job application or committed a
wrongful act during the course of employment is not protected
from discrimination, even if, at the time of the discriminatory con-
duct, the employee was performing satisfactorily. 133 To hold that
such an employee sustains no injury, either financially or emo-
tionally, as a result of discrimination is a fiction which cannot be
justified.13 4
131 See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976).
132 See Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
133 Although these decisions often pay homage to the principle that after-acquired evi-
dence is not to be considered on the issue of liability, the practical effect of the decisions is
to preclude any finding of liability by dismissing the case on summary judgment. In so
doing, these decisions have held, as a matter of law, that the employee either would not
have been hired or would have been fired based on the after acquired evidence. This deter-
mination, however, more realistically presents a material question of fact, thereby making
summary judgment inappropriate. The United States Supreme Court has held, when rul-
ing on a motion for summary judgment, that a court must resolve all reasonable inferences
in favor of the party defending the motion, or as is usually the case, the plaintiff. See An-
derson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398
U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970); see also Ramseur v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 865 F.2d 460, 465 (2d
Cir. 1989); Eastway Constr. Corp. v. New York City, 762 F.2d 243, 249 (2d Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987).134 See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 661 (1987) (discrimination "is a fun-
damental injury to the individual rights of a person"); Massey v. Trump's Castle Hotel &
Casino, 828 F. Supp. 314 (D. N.J. 1993). The argument that a plaintiff, in an after-acquired
evidence case, sustains no harm further weakens under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which,
unlike Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, allows plaintiffs to recover for emotional
harm suffered as a result of the discrimination. A plaintiff whose case is dismissed on
summary judgment under the "no injury" theory never has a chance to recover for this
harm.
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 also provides that if a plaintiff can prove that a discrimina-
tory factor played a role in the adverse action and the defendant can prove that the same
action would have been taken even absent the discriminatory factor, the court may still
grant declaratory or injunctive relief as well as attorney fees and costs. See 42 U.S.C.§§ 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i); see also Washington v. Lake Cty., 969 F.2d 250, 256 n.6 (7th Cir.
1992) (suggesting, in dicta, that using after-acquired evidence to cut off damages might be
inconsistent with Civil Rights Act of 1991); Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176,
1181 (2d Cir. 1992).
Finally, the argument that a plaintiff in an after-acquired evidence case sustains no in-jury as a result of the discrimination seems to be at odds with decisions interpreting other
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Defendants argue that employees who make misrepresentations
on their resume or job applications receive a windfall when they
are awarded damages against an employer who arguably would
not have hired them in the first place or who would have termi-
nated them had the omissions or misrepresentations been dis-
closed. This argument has surface appeal, however, it weakens
under closer scrutiny.
Allowing a defendant, who has engaged in discrimination, to
use after-acquired evidence to preclude the plaintiff from ob-
taining any relief allows the defendant to gain a windfall from the
discrimination.' 3 5 In Mount Healthy, the Supreme Court stated
that the constitutional principles at stake from plaintiffs exercise
of his First Amendment rights are "sufficiently vindicated if [the]
employee is placed in no worse a position than if he had not
engaged in the conduct. " 136 Consistent with this principle, Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor, in her concurring opinion in Price
Waterhouse, made clear that, in a mixed-motive analysis, the fo-
cus is on what actually would have happened absent the discrimi-
natory motive. Justice O'Connor stated that an employer must
"demonstrate that with the illegitimate factor removed from the
calculus, sufficient business reasons would have induced it to take
the same employment action. This evidentiary scheme essentially
requires the employer to place the employee in the same position
he or she would have occupied absent discrimination."'3 7
Under these principles, had the defendant not engaged in the
discriminatory conduct, the employee would not have had to file
the lawsuit, the after-acquired evidence would not have been dis-
antidiscrimination laws. For instance, in the housing discrimination context, individuals
who, without intending to rent or purchase a home or apartment, pose as renters or buyers
for the purpose of collecting evidence of unlawful discrimination have standing to sue for
relief based on the discriminatory treatment to which they are subjected. See Havens Re-
alty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 374 (1982); see also Fair Employment Council of
Greater Washington, Inc. v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 829 F. Supp. 402, 402 (D. D.C. 1993) (test-
ers have standing to sue under Title VII); Watts v. Boyd Properties, Inc., 758 F.2d 1482,
1485 (11th Cir. 1985) (testers have standing under 42 U.S.C. § 1982); Meyers v. Pennypack
Woods Home Ownership Assoc., 559 F.2d 894, 894 (3d Cir. 1977).
135 See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975). Under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, if there is a finding of liability, the plaintiff is presumed to be
entitled to back pay. Id. In such a case, back pay should only be denied where such a denial
will not "frustrate the central purposes of eradicating discrimination... and making per-
sons whole from injuries suffered through past discrimination." Id.
136 See Mount Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285 (1977).
137 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 276-77 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (emphasis added).
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covered, and the plaintiff would still be working for the defend-
ant.138 Thus, when after-acquired evidence is used to preclude re-
covery, the plaintiff is clearly not placed in the same position in
which he would have been absent the discrimination. This is es-
pecially true if, at the time of the discriminatory decision, the
plaintiff was performing in a satisfactory manner.139
The middle ground approach to the application of after-acquired
evidence on damages is that the evidence may be used to limit or
reduce damages. 40 This approach represents a compromise be-
tween the employer and the employee. Under this approach, how-
ever, there is still uncertainty in determining how to limit or re-
duce the damages. The question to be answered is how should a
court apply the compromise approach without randomly having to
offset the plaintiffs damages. 41
In Proulx v. Citibank, N.A.,142 the plaintiff brought suit for dis-
criminatory treatment and discriminatory discharge based on
gender. The suit was based on the activities of one of the plain-
tiffs supervisors. The defendant argued that plaintiff imminently
would have been fired for nondiscriminatory reasons because, in
the past, the plaintiff was frequently late for work and had been
warned about his tardiness. During the course of discovery, the
plaintiff also admitted that he had lied about his work record on
his job application. 143 Under defendant's established policies, the
138 See Moodie v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 831 F. Supp. 333, 336 (S.D.N.Y.
1993) ("Allowing the use of after acquired evidence as a complete defense 'would have the
perverse effect of providing a windfall to employers who, in the absence of their lawful act
and the ensuing litigation would never have discovered' the wrongdoing." (quoting Wallace
v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1182 (11th Cir. 1992))).
139 Permitting the use of after-acquired evidence allows and encourages defendants to
submit self-serving affidavits and testimony as to the actions that it would have taken had
it known of the after-acquired evidence. This clearly works to the employer's benefit where,
at the time of the discrimination, the plaintiff was performing satisfactorily and there was
no indication that the employer would have discovered or even looked for the after acquired
evidence. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 252 n.14 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). The
suggestion "that the employer's own testimony as to the probable decision in the absence of
discrimination is due special credence where the court has, contrary to the employer's testi-
mony, found that an illegitimate factor played a part in the decision, is baffling." Id. at 252.
140 See Revised Enforcement Guidance on Recent Developments in Disparate Treatment
Theory, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Pol'y No. N915.002 (July 14, 1992).
Following this compromise approach, the EEOC issued a policy statement which an-
nounced that it would not consider after-acquired evidence on the issue of liability, but
would consider such evidence for the possible reduction of damages. Id.
141 Generally the employer learns about after-acquired evidence during the discovery
process. Thus, the date that the employer actually discovers the after-acquired evidence is
tainted by the discrimination and the employee's efforts to vindicate his rights.
142 681 F. Supp. 199 (S.D.N.Y.), affd without opinion, 862 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1988).
143 Id. at 202.
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plaintiff was, therefore, a candidate for dismissal.14 4 As a result,
the defendant argued that the plaintiffs damages, if any, should
be minimal. The court, however, found no reason to limit the
plaintiffs damages based on the after-acquired evidence.' 45 The
court found that although the plaintiff had been warned two times
in the past about his attendance problems, at least one warning
came from the same supervisor who was the center of the plain-
tiffs difficulties. 146 With respect to the falsification of the job ap-
plication, the court stated that there was no evidence that the fal-
sification was about to be detected by the employer. As to this
point, the court also found it significant that the plaintiffs most
recent job evaluation was highly favorable. Thus, the court held
that, given the evidence, the record failed to establish that the
plaintiff would have been terminated, and if so, when. 147
If after-acquired evidence is to be used to reduce damages, per-
haps the Proulx analysis is the proper analysis to be used. This is
a similar approach to the one used by the Eleventh Circuit in Wal-
lace v. Dunn Construction Co.148
There will almost always be some speculation in estimating and
offsetting damages. But courts have recognized that speculation
has its place in estimating damages and that doubts should be
resolved against the wrongdoer. 149 When a defendant attempts to
assert an after-acquired evidence defense, it should have the bur-
den of establishing first, that it would have learned of the after-
acquired evidence; second, approximately when it would have dis-
covered the information; and third, that it had consistently fired
employees in the past when such information came to light. 5 '
In a mixed-motive case, an employer could meet this burden by
showing, for example, that it had a policy or practice of conducting
144 Id.
145 Id. at 203.
146 Id.
147 Proulx v. Citibank, N.A., 681 F. Supp. 199, 203 (S.D.N.Y.), affd without opinion, 862
F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1988).
148 968 F.2d 1174, 1181-82 n.11 (1992).
149 See Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562-66
(1931); Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 383 (7th Cir.),
reh'g denied, 480 U.S. 934 (1986); Trout v. Garrett, 780 F. Supp. 1396, 1420 n.57 (D.D.C.
1991) (in attempting to remedy employment discrimination, district court should err on
side of relief rather than denial of relief because employer, as proven discriminator, should
bear risk of error).
150 See Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1181-82 (11th Cir. 1992); Proulx v.
Citibank, N.A., 681 F. Supp. 199 (S.D.N.Y.), affd without opinion, 862 F.2d 304 (2d Cir.
1988).
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internal routine audits of its departments and that the evidence
likely would have been discovered in the next audit.' 5 ' Similarly,
the defendant could demonstrate that, at the time of the discrimi-
natory termination, there was already in progress an investiga-
tion or audit that would have detected the plaintiffs wrongdoing.
The distinction between this approach and the approach used in
Wallace is that under this approach, the employee's economic
damages may go beyond the date of judgment if the employer can-
not establish when it would have discovered the wrongdoing. The
policy behind this standard should recognize that where the em-
ployee was performing in a satisfactory manner and there is no
apparent reason that his misrepresentation or wrongdoing would
have been detected, the employer should not be allowed to gain a
windfall by cutting off damages based on evidence it acquired as a
result of the plaintiffs lawsuit to redress the discrimination to
which he was subjected.
CONCLUSION
The optimal approach to the use of after-acquired evidence is
that it should have no effect on liability or damages, as it does not
relate to the underlying acts of discrimination. However, if a com-
promise approach is to be used, allowing employers to produce af-
ter-acquired evidence to reduce damages, the compromise ap-
proach should require employers to make an affirmative showing
to the trier of fact concerning how and approximately when the
after-acquired evidence would have been discovered and that such
evidence would have resulted in the employee's termination. If
the employer makes this showing, damages could be cut off as of
the date that the after-acquired evidence would have been
discovered.
151 The employer might be able to meet its burden if, for example, it could show that it
had actually audited resumes in the past and dismissed employees with falsified informa-
tion, or that it had dismissed employees when resume falsifications had otherwise
surfaced.
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